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Abstract: Throughout the international climate change regime’s development up until
2012, the emergence of new and helpful mechanisms and negotiation processes were
often accompanied by setbacks such as withdrawals and unmet State obligation. The
object of this study focused on international community and indonesia’s policy towards
climate change. The Method of this study is normative legal research. The result of this
thesis is to situate the internal/domestic climate of several States (the U.S., Canada,
Brazil, Norway, and Indonesia) and one regional organization (the EU); and connect it to
the outward international policies each have chosen to put forward on the negotiation
table and/or submit themselves to. Given the global nature of and concern about climate
change, it feels as if there is no shortage of lessons to pick – from outright refusal to be
legally bound to the regime at all (the U.S.), an unprecedented and recent move of formal
and official withdrawal from the regime’s key instrument (Canada), the struggles with
implementation that a regional organization might face (the European Union), to the
recent moves and measures in environmental protection pioneered and led by States
characterized by their increasingly strong economies (Brazil, Norway, and Indonesia).
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INTRODUCTION
International law’s very nature
depends on States – namely, their
ability to voluntarily submit themselves
to rules that bind them. The practices
that States, represented by their leaders
and officials, go through (and reflect
this nature) have been studied
extensively for as long as human
civilization, with opinions ranging
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from Machiavellian and realpolitik to
hopeful and idealistic. International
environmental law in particular is
interesting because, unlike other
international legal regimes such as
terrorism or money-laundering, there
seems to be a general consensus that it
is an issue – and an issue that needs to
be tackled as a global community.
Except that may not be true for the
climate change regime. Though it is
often touted as boasting, “near-
universal membership,” it would be
hard-pressed to equate that fact alone to
compliance.
The main inquiry of this article is
to examine the extent political change
(and in some cases, instability) can
influence state compliance to an
international legal regime. More
specifically, it can be argued that the
main factor influencing compliance of
this regime was the extent to which the
State governments respected the
established principles and provisions of
the international climate change
regime, and relevant general
international law norms. This attribute
followed from the general expectation
that in order to be deemed compliant, a
State ought to be supportive of, and
adhere to, international law. It was also
suggested by the context, namely, the
involvement in negotiations under the
international climate change regime, in
which relatively clear ethical
expectations were established for
Parties by the 1992 United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC),1 the 1997 Kyoto
Protocol,2 as well as subsequent
decisions of the treaty Parties.3
This article also argues that, while
the regime is in the form of framework
compare to a legally binding covenant
in relation to the negotiation of a post-
2012 agreement, the agreement does
provide a clear set of legal goals, which
can be seen from the 2015 Paris
1 United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, opened for signature 4 June
1992, 1771 UNTS 107 (entered into force 21
March 1994).
2 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change,
opened for signature 16 March 1998, 2303
UNTS 148 (entered into force 16 February
2005).
3 Includes, but is not limited to: UNFCCC,
Report of the Conference of the Parties on its
Thirteenth Session: Addendum (Part 2), UN
Doc FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (14 March 2008),
decision 1/CP.13; and UNFCCC, Report of the
Ad Hoc Working Group on Further
Commitments for Annex I Parties under the
Kyoto Protocol on its Resumed Fourth Session,
UN Doc FCCC/KP/AWG/2007/5 (5 February
2008) annex I.
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Agreement,4 and the subsequent
negotiations in Morocco the following
year.5 States try to achieve some
crucial expectations that Parties would
act consistently with the ultimate
objective of the Convention; would act
on the basis of equity and common but
differentiated responsibilities; and that
developed countries would adopt
mitigation targets that reflected a
comparative level of effort.
This thesis lists five States and one
regional organization to examine. The
United States and their refusal to
commit to any binding international
measures will open the discussion and
provide insight into the “soft” nature of
international law and international
climate change law’s particular regime.
Canada will follow and illustrate the
same; their withdrawal from one of the
regime’s distinguished instrument both
a reflection of how State (government)
party lines influences policy, as well as
4 UNFCCC, Paris Agreement. Text of the
agreement available at
http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/con
vention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreeme
nt.pdf/
5 UNFCCC, Marrakech Action
Proclamation for Our Climate and Sustainable
Development. Text available at:
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/marrakech_nov
_2016/application/pdf/marrakech_action_procl
amation.pdf/
the revocable nature of State consent.
The European Union (EU) provides
lessons in regional organizations
attempting to situate themselves in the
regime. Brazil and Norway – or rather,
their diplomats and representatives –
are both admirable in the international
negotiations arena, with domestic
implementation struggles arising at
least partially from political and
economic crises. Lastly, this thesis will
close with Indonesia’s experience,
where a determined (and often dubbed
aggressive) foreign policy and
domestic instruments reflect its own
unique selection of pressing
environmental issues.
METHOD
The method used in this study is a
type of normative legal research that
examines the application of the
principles of international law in
relation to the life of a state. As a type
of normative legal research, it is
prioritized to review the legal
materials, namely primary legal
materials, secondary legal materials,
and tertiary legal materials.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
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Illustrative States Responses To
The Climate Change Regime
The climate change regime enjoys
one of the highest levels of
participation in the international
environmental arena among both States
and stakeholder organizations,
including non-governmental
organizations (NGOs),
intergovernmental organizations
(IGOs), and UN bodies and specialized
agencies. This thesis provides an
overview of the climate change
regime’s diverse participants and how
they have organized their responses,
focusing on those most notable in
either their advancement/support of the
regime, or their supposed
nonconformity and withdrawal.
The UNFCCC enjoys one of the
highest rates of membership among
international legal regimes, with its 197
Parties including 196 States plus the
European Union, which participates as
a regional economic integration
organization.6 The Holy See, with its’
observer status, yet to ratify the
Convention; though it announced it
6 DiMento, Joseph F. C., and Doughman,
Pamela, eds. 2014. Climate Change: What It
Means for Us, Our Children, and Our
Grandchildren. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
was considering the possibility of
ratifying in December 2015.7 At the
time of writing, the Kyoto Protocol to
the Convention had been ratified by
nearly two-thirds of Parties to the
Convention, representing nearly three-
quarters of the world’s population.8
The Secretariat asks each Party to
the Convention to designate a “national
focal point,” who then serves as the
main point of contact for that party
concerning activities in the climate
change regime on a day-to-day basis.9
The great majority of Parties to the
Convention regularly attend sessions of
the regime bodies, with over 90 per
cent typically represented at COP
sessions and over 80 per cent at
subsidiary body sessions.10 The size of
7 "Pope's Encyclical on Climate Change
Reflects Urgency of the Challenge: US."
RTTNews, June 19th 2015.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/168982424
2?accountid=17242; and "Vatican intent on
signing Paris climate agreement."
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/745964/vatican-
intent-on-signing-paris-climate-agreement
Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 9th 2015.
8 For up-to-date figures on Parties to the
Convention and Kyoto Protocol, see
http://www.unfccc.int.
9 See UNFCCC, UN Doc
FCCC/CP/1996/6/Add.2, section B. The list of
national focal points is available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/nfp.html.
10 Yamin, Farhana, and Joanna Depledge.
The International Climate Change Regime: A
Guide to Rules, Institutions and Procedures.
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delegation, however, varies
significantly. Predictably, the smallest
delegations are typically those from
poorer developing countries, and the
larger ones from the wealthy,
industrialized nations. Some
developing countries with a
considerable interest in the climate
change issue, however, do also field
large delegations. Brazil, China, and
Indonesia for example, all sent
delegations of over twenty persons to
COP-21.11 However, the number of
individual delegates who have attended
high-profile COPs, compared to
subsidiary body sessions, and the
statistical trends would have to be a
study of its own.
The Parties to the climate change
regime are organized into a number of
different groups and coalitions, some of
which stem from official UN listings,
while others consist of more ad hoc
political alliances. Such listings are
arguably quite directly related to the
commitment of the Parties.
Recognition that meaningful actions to
protect our climate are possible has
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2004. p. 30.
11 See UNFCCC, List of Participants at
COP-21, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/INF.3/
come in different forms across the
globe, and across negotiating platforms
and groupings.
The States chosen in this section
were meant to be representative. Given
the global nature of and concern about
climate change, it feels as if there is no
shortage of lessons to pick – from
outright refusal to be legally bound to
the regime at all (United States), an
unprecedented and recent move of
formal and official withdrawal from the
regime’s key instrument (Canada), the
struggles with implementation that a
regional organization might face (the
European Union), to the recent moves
and measures in environmental
protection pioneered and led by States
characterized by their increasingly
strong economies (Brazil, Norway, and
Indonesia) – all hopefully serve to shed
light on some of the rhyme and reason
behind international climate change
law. All of them are illustrative of the
characteristics of the regime’s nature in
some way – and indeed, the nature of
international law in general.
United States
If one had to find one redeeming
characteristic about the position of the
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United States on the international
climate change regime, it would not
even be consistency in obstinacy.
Contested multiple times over, The
United States had over 36 per cent of
the 1990 emissions in the industrialized
countries, which are listed in Annex I
of the UNFCCC.12 As of not long ago
surpassed by China, the United States
was the biggest single supporter of an
Earth-wide temperature boost,
representing just about one-fourth of
worldwide ozone depleting substance
emanations. The size of the US
commitment reflects the size of its
economy as well according to capita
outflows that were second most
astounding (after Australia) among
industrialized.13 In any case, while
plainly a huge piece of the issue,
United States has not been a piece of
the arrangement. With Australia’s
ratification in 2007, the United States
was isolated as the only advanced
12 US Energy Information
Administration, Emission of Greenhouse Gases
in the United States. 2011. Available at:
http://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/ghg
_report/pdf/0573(2009).pdf
13 Kahn, Greg. “The Fate of the Kyoto
Protocol under the Bush Administration.”
Berkeley Journal of International Law 21 no. 3
(2003) Available at:
http://scholarship.law.berkele.edu/bjil/vol21/iss
3/5.
industrialized country to decline to
ratify. At the domestic level, the US
federal government has adopted
relatively weak climate policies,
relying on voluntary programs and
modest government expenditures on
research. Not surprisingly, in response
US emissions have continued to
increase, if at a rate lower that its
population and economic growth.
The reality of the matter is that the
United States approved the UNFCCC
in October 1992, yet Senate discuss on
confirmation concentrated on financial
costs, consequences for aggressiveness,
and the inability to request that creating
nations lessen discharges. The Senate's
recommendation and agree to approval
happened, to some degree, since
objectives for decrease of discharges
were willful. Ratification of the
Convention moved U.S. climate change
policy from "study only" to "study and
action," though U.S. action was noted –
both nationally and internationally – to
be, “cautious and limited.”14
14 Yacobucci, Brent D. 2010. Climate
Change: Federal Laws and Policies Related to
Greenhouse Gas Reductions. Bibliogov, 2013.
See also Carlarne, Cinnamon Piñon. Climate
Change Law and Policy: EU and US
Approaches. Oxford: Oxford University Press..
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The Kyoto Protocol was adopted
in 1997 and in force from February 16,
2005. It has been established that it set
legally binding standards for reduction
of GHG emissions, where industrial
(i.e. Annex 1) countries, must reduce
aggregate emissions of six GHGs to
5% below 1990 levels between 2008
and 2012.15
Though willing to make a
voluntary commitment under the
Convention, the United States was not
politically motivated to ratify the
Kyoto Protocol. In July 1997, even
before adoption of the Protocol, the
Senate resolved to reject new
commitments for GHG reduction
unless developing countries had
obligations. Noting that emissions from
developing countries were expected to
surpass those of developed countries by
2015, the Senate stated, "the exemption
for Developing Country Parties is
inconsistent with the need for global
action on climate change and is
environmentally flawed."16 The Senate
15 UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, op. cit.
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.ph
p
16 Grossman, Margaret Rosso. “Climate
Change and the Law.” The American Journal
of Comparative Law 58. American Society of
Comparative Law (2010): p. 229.
feared "serious harm" to the U.S.
economy from "significant job loss,
trade disadvantages, [and] increased
energy and consumer costs."17 Hence,
however the United States signed the
Kyoto Protocol, it was never sent to the
Senate for counsel and assent.18 In
2001, President George W. Bush
dismissed the Protocol, calling it
"fatally flawed in fundamental ways"
and "unrealistic" and citing issues of
cost, competitiveness, and exemptions
for developing countries.19
In 2009, President Obama
promised to work with the UN to
develop a new international treaty on
climate change to replace the Kyoto
Protocol for when would expire in
2012.20 The U.S. proposal for the treaty
indicated that the United States was
"committed to reaching a strong
international agreement in Copenhagen
based on both the robust targets and
ambitious actions that will be
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Pershing, Jonathan; Deputy Special
Envoy for Climate Change, Remarks During
Press Conference Call with Senior U.S.
Climate Change Officials (May 29, 2009).
http://www.state.gov/e/oes/rls/remarks/2009/12
4210.htm/
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embodied in U.S. domestic law […]"21
This implies under its terms, the United
States would confront a bigger number
of emissions lessening than most
nations and would give monetary and
innovative help to developing nations.
President Obama renewed his
promise in September 2009 speech to
the UN Climate Change Summit,
assuring that the United States would
battle climate change by "investing in
renewable energy and promoting
greater efficiency and slashing our
emissions to reach the targets we set
for 2020 and our long-term goals for
2050."22 In January 2010, in
association with the Copenhagen
Accord reached at the Summit, the
United States committed to a reduction
of GHG emissions; and in the
following years, the President
strengthened its status as a federal
21 U.S. Department of State, U.S.
Submission on Copenhagen Agreed Outcome,
Introductory Comments (May 29, 2009)
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/
07.pdf/
22 White House, Remarks by the President
at United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-
Moon's Climate Change Summit (Sept. 22,
2009) (noting also that the United States "has
done more to promote clean energy and reduce
carbon pollution in the last eight months than at
any other time in our history")
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/remarks-president-un-secretary-general-
ban-ki-moons-climate-change-summit/
priority by Executive Order, and
affirmed the state’s continued
commitment through State of the
Union address.23
Domestically speaking, a good
number of governmental institutions
formulated agendas in order to comply
with the Executive Order.24 However,
in terms of legal battles – of which the
U.S. has plenty – one may cite The US
Supreme Court’s decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA, which
compelled the EPA to act according to
section 202(a) Clean Air Act. The Act,
which was federal in nature, requires
the EPA to set standards for “any air
pollutant.” At the point when the EPA
agreed, and the findings affirmed that
GHGs represent a threat to human
wellbeing and welfare and ought to be
regulated. Therefore, President Obama
guided the EPA to react to the
solicitations of the condition of the
state of California and thirteen other
states for waivers, precluding states
from directing auto emissions.
23 Grossman, Margaret Rosso, op. cit. p.
231.
24 Climate Change – Government
Institutions | U.S. Department of Interior.
https://www.doi.gov/oia/climate-
change/governmental-institutions/
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One case out of many, this
illustrates the shaky steps and practices
that the United States have tried taking
within their own domestic sphere to
regulate climate change, albeit based
primarily through litigation. Though
admirable, this quite obviously does
not equate to compliance to
international commitments. In the wake
of the 2015 Paris Agreement,25 and
coinciding with the Presidential
Election of 2016, candidates expressed
views on the issue – and the given
international agreement – that seemed
typically along characteristic party
lines.26
As of this thesis’ writing, there is
worry rippling throughout the
international community about the
United States’ role in mitigating and
adapting the climate change after the
nation has voted for President-Elect
Trump. States party to the international
climate regime are very visibly
cautious, and this is seen best in COP-
22, the Marrakech Climate Change
25 Ahead of Paris Conference, Udall
Calls for Global Collaboration, US Leadership
to Address Climate Change. 2015. Lanham:
Federal Information & News Dispatch, Inc.
26 Rakisits, Claude. 2016. "The
Climate Change Agreement and the Mixed US
Reaction." Defence Journal 19 no. 6. pp. 56-
57.
Conference.27 As a candidate with a
platform – and constituents – largely
disbelieving of environmental
problems, especially climate change,
the fact that he had gained enormous
traction is troubling to say the least.
This overwhelming concern is
explainable given the financial and
technological advances as well as the
influence it holds as a State. The
United States is projected to backtrack
from the global commitment
established by the previous
administration. Key among these issues
is funding – compensation given by
developed countries for the global
warming caused since the days of the
Industrial Revolution – to developing
countries making an effort to reduce
GHG emissions by preserving the
environment and natural resources.
Suffice to say, despite the best
efforts of the left-leaning political
parties/inclinations as well as
international political gestures, the
United States as a country has yet to
enact a comprehensive climate law that
reflects its ostensible position in the
27 Susanto, Ichwan. "Merebut Masa
Depan Bumi Pada Pertemuan Maroko."
Kompas (Jakarta), November 13, 2016; IPTEK
- Lingkungan dan Kesehatan sec.
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international arena. Indeed, until
recently, the federal government's
attitude toward climate change ranged
from "simple inaction to outright
obstructionism," with little meaningful
federal regulation, and documented
efforts to play down the extent and
serious effects of climate change. It is
not a stretch of the imagination that this
sort of stance, taken by a State of such
influence, would undoubtedly be
problematic and harmful to
international discourse – and the debate
surrounding the efficacy of the
international legal regime on climate
change – as a whole.28
Canada
One of the most significant actions
taken by a State in recent years with
regard to the international climate
change regime is the withdrawal of
Canada from the Kyoto Protocol in
2011.29 Canada had been active in the
28 Tollefson, Jeff. "US Supreme Court Puts
Obama Climate Regulations on Hold." Nature,
2016. http://www.nature.com/news/global-
warming-hiatus-debate-flares-up-again-
1.19414.
29 Kneteman, Christie. "Canada." Yearbook
of International Environmental Law 23 no. 1
(2012): pp. 355-358. See also Borick,
Christopher P., Erick Lachapelle, and Barry
Rabe. Climate compared: Public opinion on
climate change in the United States and
Canada (2011) Brookings Institute.
negotiations that led to the Protocol’s
birth in 1997 and in ratifying the Kyoto
Protocol in December 2002, it
acknowledged maybe the most
aggressive duty among all parties to the
treaty.30 In spite of the fact that
Canada's formal target was to decrease
its emissions to 6 percent under 1990
levels by 2008 to 2012, Canadian
policymakers realized that with a
specific end goal to go along they
would need to convey a 30 percent
lessening below anticipated emissions
by 2010.31 The effect of such profound
diminishments on monetary
aggressiveness lingered particularly
extensive after the withdrawal from the
Kyoto Protocol of Canada's biggest
trading country, the United States, in
2001. Thus, its’ withdrawal – which
was submitted to the Secretary General
of the UN on December 2011 and came
into effect a year later – was
unprecedented: cited as a hallmark of
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/201
1/04/climate-change-opinion.
30 Harrison, Kathryn. 2010. “The Struggle
of Ideas and Self-Interest in Canadian Climate
Policy,” in American and Comparative
Environmental Policy: Global Commons,
Domestic Decision: The Comparative Politics
of Climate Change. Cambridge, US: The MIT
Press.
31 Government of Canada. 2002. Climate
Change Plan for Canada. Ottawa: Government
of Canada.
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climate change’s politicized nature at
best, and the international climate
change regime’s paper-tiger status at
worst.32
Admittedly, Canadian climate
policy is characterized by a series of
ambitious but unfulfilled
commitments.33 Canada’s failure even
to contain emissions growth, and each
successive government’s promise of
deep cuts – albeit with ever-receding
dates for compliance – makes the
State’s eventual withdrawal less of a
surprise though no less influential.
On May 28th 2011, the federal
government released a statement
regarding certain considerations
underlying its decision to withdraw
from the Protocol, including that:
To fulfill its obligations under the
Protocol, Canada would have to
purchase a significant and costly
amount of international credits using
funds that could be invested here, in
Canada, on domestic priorities,
including the environment […].
Importantly for Canada, the United
32 Gnas, Herbert. "The Kyoto Protocol and
the JUSCANNZ/Umbrella Group Countries -
Party and Political System-Conditioned
Determinants." Annales Universitatis Mariae
Curie-Sklodowska 21 no.1 (2014): p. 23-40.
33 Harrison, Kathryn. Loc. cit.
States, which is Canada’s biggest
economic trading partner and is
responsible for nearly 20 [per cent] of
global emissions, is not covered by the
Kyoto Protocol.34
Canada also confirmed at the 2011
UN climate talks in Bonn, Germany,
that it would not support an extended
Kyoto Protocol after 2012. It joined
Japan and Russia in rejecting a new
round of Kyoto, which at the time
made European nations suggest that
they would not sign on to the Protocol
unless emerging economies take strong
targets under a new deal.35 This
resulted in plenty of criticism that
claimed this particular move of Canada
put the future of the Kyoto Protocol in
34 Kneteman, Christie, op. cit. For a
discussion on the significance of US-Canada
relations with regard to such a politicized issue
as climate change, see also Kirton, John.
“Consequences of the 2008 US Elections for
America's Climate Change Policy, Canada, and
the World.” International Journal 64 no. 1
(2008). [Sage Publications, Ltd., Canadian
International Council]: pp. 153–62.
35 International Institute for Sustainable
Development (IISD) "Summary of the Durban
Climate Change Conference." Earth
Negotiations Bulletin (ENB) vol 12 (534) (13
December 2011)
http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12534e.html/. See
also “Canada Rejects Kyoto Protocol
Extension,” The Huffington Post (8 August
2011)
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/08/ca
nada-kyoto-protocol-2011-
extension_n_873461.html/
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jeopardy.36 While we now know that
the Protocol continues to exist, some
suggest that there was real risk that the
instrument “may become an empty
shell with no targets, thereby creating a
regulatory gap post-2012.”37
With an increasing rift between
developing countries (which have no
obligations under the Kyoto Protocol
and which want the commitments
binding current Kyoto Protocol nations
to be extended for a second period with
deeper targets) and wealthy countries
(which want large emerging economies
including India and China to accept
parallel legal obligations or at least to
lower their emissions growth), it
seemed unlikely to Canada that any
solutions to curb rising global
greenhouse gas ("GHG") emissions
will result from the UNFCCC process.
Even so, from a domestic lens,
while the federal government was slow
to build up an observing and tenable
reduction administration, a number of
provincial governments have built up
significant projects to lessen emissions
on their individual territories. English
Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario and
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
Quebec have joined the Western
Climate Initiative, a meeting of 7 states
of the Western United States whose
point is to build up a typical structure
to set up a carbon credit market. These
regions have likewise made
commitments with respect to the
reduction and reported solid steps to
decrease greenhouse gas emissions.
Alberta has a built up
"Environmental Change Action Plan",
which was announced in 2008. The
Specified Gas Emitters Regulation in
Alberta made it the first jurisdiction in
North America to have a price on
carbon. Reduction programs in
different regions are significantly less
developed. Canada's two biggest
regions, Ontario and Quebec, are
careful about government approaches
moving the weight of greenhouse
reductions on them with a specific end
goal to give Alberta and Saskatchewan
more space to additionally build up
their tar sands reserves, in this way
chilling relations between the 13
regions and domains.
On an international level, it must
be said that despite its withdrawal from
the Kyoto Protocol, Canada remained
officially supportive of the Copenhagen
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Accord, the Cancun Agreements, and
the Durban Platform.38 With the
election of a new Liberal
administration under Prime Minister
Justin Trudeau – who assumed office in
November 2014 – Canada seems keen
to continue having this position in the
wake the 2015 Paris Agreement.39
European Union
Many reviews boldly express that
the European Union has situated itself
as the universal plan setter for climate
change mitigation. At a few basic
points, the EU and its individuals have
received approaches and projects that
have put it at the bleeding edge of
universal endeavors to address
environmental change.40 In the early
1990s, a few European nations led the
pack in building up willful domestic
emission reduction targets. In October
1990, responding to these national
38 Ibid.
39 Statement by the Prime Minister of
Canada on Successful Conclusion of Paris
Climate Conference.
http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2015/12/12/statement
-prime-minister-canada-successful-conclusion-
paris-climate-conference. See also IISD, “Paris
Highlights,” Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB)
vol 12 (653) (1 December 2015)
http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12653e.html/
40 Harris, Paul G. Europe and Global
Climate Change: Politics, Foreign Policy and
Regional Cooperation. Cheltenham, UK:
Edward Elgar, 2007.
improvements, the European ministers
of energy and the environment declared
that the European Community (EC) all
in all would try to settle its joint carbon
dioxide emissions at 1990 levels by the
turn of the century, an objective that
the EU could accomplish. In 1997, in
the months paving the way to the
Kyoto Protocol transactions, the EU set
the tone for the universal arrangements
with its suggestion that industrialized
states focus on decreasing their
greenhouse gas emissions by 15
percent of 1990 levels by 2010. While
at last the EU focused on a
significantly more humble 8 percent
decrease of 1990 greenhouse gas
emissions by 2008–2012, the EU put
other nations on edge, pushing them to
go more remote than they had said they
were eager or ready to go.41
Another significant instance of EU
leadership was its decision to move
forward with ratification of the Kyoto
Protocol after President Bush made
clear on 2001 that the United States
41 The shift in the target was in part an
accession on the part of the EU to the demand
of the US that a larger basket of greenhouse gas
emissions be included. The EU’s 15 percent
target was in relation to three greenhouse
gases, while the 8 percent target covered six
greenhouse gases.
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intended to withdraw from the
agreement.42 The US pullout left
Europe in a problem. The United States
represented 36.1 percent of the 1990
CO2 discharges of industrialized
nations. The EU all in all was in charge
of a to some degree smaller 24.2
percent. In the event that the Protocol
was to survive, the EU would need to
persuade states representing to another
30.8 percent of 1990 industrialized
nation CO2 emissions to go along with
it in confirming the understanding so as
to meet the Kyoto Protocol's to some
degree self-assertive necessity that 55
percent of industrialized states' 1990
CO2 emissions be represented by
ratifying states all together for the
consent to become effective.
In a 2003 survey conducted by the
EC, 88 per cent of European voters
supported taking immediate actions to
address climate change.43 By signing
the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, countries
in the EU agreed to reduce their
greenhouse-gas emissions by 8 per cent
42 Kahn, Greg. Loc. cit.
43 DiMento, Joseph F.C., op. cit. See also
Fischer, Thomas B., and Olivier Sykes. “The
Territorial Agenda of the European Union:
Progress for Climate Change Mitigation and
Adaptation?” The Town Planning Review 80
no.1. (2009) Liverpool University Press: pp.
57–82.
of 1990 levels by 2008 to 2012,
although targets for individual EU
countries vary.
On a more practical level, in effort
to find cost-effective ways to reduce
emissions and despite initial strong
resistance from key member states
(most noteworthy in this regard
Germany), the EU implemented the
world’s first international CO2
emissions trading scheme (ETS),
modeled on the successful US sulfur
dioxide emissions trading system
established by the US Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990.44 Thus, the EU
Parliament has made the goal
established by the international regime,
by all means and purposes, legally
binding, and a number of regional and
national policies — including the
aforementioned creation of a trading
system for CO2 emissions — aimed to
reach this target.
The design of this market has been
controversial. In Germany, for
example, environmentalists supported
an EU-wide market with mandatory
compliance by individual companies,
44 Peeters, Marjan and Kurt Deketelaere
(eds.). 2006. EU Climate Change Policy: The
Challenge of New Regulatory Initiatives.
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
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while industry groups supported
voluntary participation in a market
designed to help each country in the
EU attain its greenhouse-gas reduction
targets.45 Other members have revoked
or objected to new tax instruments:
Finland repealed its carbon tax,46
Sweden weakened its tax,47 and France
and England have strongly resisted EU-
wide carbon taxes.48 In addition to
emissions trading, the European
Commission has strengthened energy-
efficiency requirements for both
residential and nonresidential
buildings. In Europe, where buildings
consume 40 per cent of energy (more
than any other part of the economy),
energy-efficiency advocates argue that
the European Union could exceed its
Kyoto Protocol targets through
improved insulation, heating, cooling,
and lighting technology and like
actions.
45 Ibid, p. 112.
46 Herber, Bernard P., and Jose T. Raga.
1995. “An International Carbon Tax to Combat
Global Warming: An Economic and Political
Analysis of the European Union Proposal.” The
American Journal of Economics and Sociology
54 no. 3. pp. 257–67.
47 DiMento, Joseph F.C., op. cit. See also
Nolin, Jan. 1999. “Global Policy and National
Research: The International Shaping of
Climate Research in Four European Union
Countries” Minerva 37 no. 2. Springer: pp.
125–40.
48 Ibid.
Brazil
The most extraordinary
deforestation has occurred in Brazil.49
Since 1988, Brazilians have cleared
more than 153,000 square miles of
Amazonian rain timberland,50 a zone
bigger than Germany. With the
resulting increase in arable land, Brazil
has helped feed the growing global
demand for commodities With the
subsequent growth in arable land,
Brazil has sustained the developing
worldwide interest for products,51 for
example, soybeans52 and beef – yet the
natural cost has been steep.
Notwithstanding giving living spaces to
untold quantities of plant and creature
species and releasing around 20 for
49 Fearnside, Philip M. 2005.
“Deforestation in Brazilian Amazonia: History,
Rates, and Consequences.” Conservation
Biology 19 no. 3. [Wiley, Society for
Conservation Biology]: pp. 680–88
50 Ibid.
51 Wiebelt, Manfred. 1999. “Stopping
Deforestation in the Amazon: Trade-off
between Ecological and Economic
Targets?”Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 131 no.
3. Springer: pp. 542–68.
52 For a more thorough research on the
correlation(s) between climate change,
deforestation, and Brazil’s agricultural/food
policy, See Macedo, Marcia N., Ruth S.
DeFries, Douglas C. Morton, Claudia M.
Stickler, Gillian L. Galford, and Yoshio E.
Shimabukuro. “Decoupling of Deforestation
and Soy Production in the Southern Amazon
during the Late 2000s” Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences of the United
States of America 109 no. 4 (2012).
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every penny of the world's fresh water,
the Amazon basin assumes a vital part
in controlling the world's atmosphere,
putting away immense amounts of
carbon dioxide that would some way or
another add to a global warming.53
Slashing and burning the Amazon rain
woods discharges the carbon secured
up plants and soils; from an atmosphere
point of view, clearing the rain
timberland is the same as copying
petroleum products, for example, oil
and gas. Late gauges propose that
deforestation and related exercises
represent 10-15 for each penny of
worldwide carbon dioxide discharges.54
But in recent years, good news has
emerged from the Amazon. Due to the
major importance of its forests for
Brazil, as well as a new global
emphasis on sustainable development,
the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) was recognized under the
Kyoto Protocol. It was touted as the
achievement of policy goals regarding
sustainable development, where special
emphasis was placed on the
geographical distribution of projects
and Brazil’s hefty contribution to the
53 Fearnside, op. cit.
54 Ibid.
initiative. It became the policymaking
goals of the CDM’s Brazilian
architects. The CDM arose from the
Brazilian Proposal’s Clean
Development Fund, and was negotiated
between Brazil and the United States.
The climate bill signed by
Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da
Silva in 2009 has pulled in the
consideration of the press and Brazil's
environmental community. This is not
surprising, given that the law
recommends the mentality of Brazil
with respect to climate change has
essentially changed. It gives a lawful
premise to the National Policy on
Climate Change (Política Nacional
sobre Mudança do Clima, or PNMC)
and Brazil's universal sense of duty
regarding reduce greenhouse gas
emissions. The latter was publicized
half a month preceding the Fifteenth
Conference of the Parties (COP-15) of
the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) in Copenhagen, and has
been expressed in Brazil's formal
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submission of January 2010 under the
terms of the Copenhagen Accord.55
Previously, Brazil, along with
other emerging economies, had insisted
that developing countries must receive
financial assistance to implement
mitigation actions. In doing so, Brazil
cited the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities (CBDR)
contained in the UNFCCC text as well
as the historic responsibility of
industrialized countries for current
concentrations of GHG in the
atmosphere. However, during COP-15,
President Lula emphasized Brazil's
domestic commitment to reducing
GHG emissions and, even more
surprisingly, declared that Brazil would
financially support developing
countries if necessary. Brazil further
demonstrated the need for compromise
by playing a leadership role during the
final day of COP-15, culminating in the
Copenhagen Accord, earning
substantial praise. It is clear, however,
that Brazil will not entirely discard the
principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities. Brazil's Copenhagen
55 Decision 2/CP.15, Copenhagen Accord,
UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/ 11/Add.1, 18 to 19
December 2009.
Accord submission56 incorporates a
reference to CBDR and states the
voluntary nature of the proposed
actions.
In 28 September 2015, Brazil
presented its Intended Nationally
Determined Contribution (INDC), with
an objective to reduce net greenhouse
gas emissions, including land use, land
use change and forestry (LULUCF), by
37% below 2005 levels by 2025.
Moreover, it said a "characteristic
commitment" to reduce emissions by
43% below 2005 levels (incl.
LULUCF) by 2030, with studies
finding that Brazil is near meeting its
INDC focuses under current
strategies.57
Perhaps most noticeable is the fact
that Brazil became a test case for a
controversial international climate-
change prevention strategy known as
REDD+, short for “reducing emissions
from deforestation and forest
56 See Brazil's submission No 5,
Communications received from Parties in
relation to the listing in the chapeau of the
Copenhagen Accord, available at:
https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/copenh
agen_accord/application/pdf/brazilcphaccord_a
pp2.pdf/.
57Climate Action Tracker, Countries:
Brazil. 2015. Available at
http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/brazil.
html
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degradation,” which places a monetary
value on the carbon stored in forests;58
as well as “conservation, sustainable
management of forests, and
enhancement of carbon stocks.”59
Under such a framework, developed
nations could pay developing nations to
ensure their own particular
timberlands, in this manner
hypothetically balancing the built up
nations' emissions at home.60 Brazil's
involvement with REDD recommends
that, in addition to offering different
advantages to forests occupants (human
and something else), the model can be
cheap and quick: Brazil has
accomplished more to lessen outflows
than some other nation on the planet as
of late, without using up every last
cent.
The REDD+ model remains a
work in development. In Brazil and
different spots where components of
REDD have been connected, the
financing still cannot seem to achieve
58 UN-REDD Programme, About
REDD+. http://www.unredd.net/about/what-is-
redd-plus.html/.
59 Ibid.
60 Laurance, William F. 2008. “Better
REDD Than Dead (response from Laurance)”.
Bioscience 58 no. 8. [American Institute of
Biological Sciences, Oxford University Press]:
677–77.
large portions of its expected
recipients, and institutional changes
have been slow to develop. This has
added to a rustic reaction against the
new implementation measures in the
Brazilian Amazon – a backfire that the
legislature is as yet attempting to
contain. In any case, if Brazil can unite
its initial increases, fabricate accord
around a more extensive vision for
improvement, and finish a program to
redesign the economies of its rainforest
areas, it could make ready for another
period of ecological administration
over the tropics. Surprisingly, maybe, it
is conceivable to think about a
conclusion to the time of huge scale
human deforestation.
Norway
Norway is interesting in that its
leadership ambitions in international
climate politics are well documented;61
all while simultaneously being a
country whose major export is
petroleum.62 Norway has become
61 Sæverud, Ingvild Andreassen, and Jørgen
Wettestad. 2006. “Norway and emissions
trading: From global front-runner to EU
follower.” International Environmental
Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 6
no.1. pp. 91-108.
62 Havro, Gø and Javier Santiso.2008. To
Benefit from Plenty: Lessons from Chile and
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internationally known as a high-profile
environmental negotiator, with a self-
declared goal to act as a driving force
in international climate talks.
In terms of national policy-
making, it was the first to adopt a
national emission target – in 1989 –
and was also a forerunner in levying a
carbon tax – in 1991. After it proved
more difficult to cut domestic
emissions than anticipated, Norway
became an early proponent of
flexibility mechanisms, including
emissions trading together with the US
– at a time when the EU remained
highly critical of such mechanisms.63
It must be noted that Norway is the
single largest REDD+ donor, and has
entered bilateral agreements with four
countries: Tanzania, Brazil, Guyana,
and Indonesia.64 In 2010 the
Norway. Paris: Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD).
63 Ibid. It is interesting to note, however,
that from the late 1990s, however, an
interesting reversal took place. The EU become
a frontrunner in the trading system, while non-
EU member Norway’s emission trading
policies increasingly resembled EU policy.
64 Sulistiawati, Linda Yanti. 2013.
"REDD+ Issues Influence in Indonesia's
Regulatory Process Case Studies: UNREDD
Indonesia, REDD Plus Project Indonesia-
Norway." Order No. 3588863, University of
Washington.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/142874672
5?accountid=17242
governments of Norway and Indonesia
signed a REDD+ agreement, known as
the Climate Change Partnership, under
which Norway provided Indonesia with
US$1 billion to assist that country with
the detailed and phased implementation
of REDD+.65 This Partnership is
demonstrated the influences that
bilateral REDD+ agreements can have
on individual tropical rainforest
developing country jurisdictions. It is
clear that a key component of the
Partnership is supposed to be the full
and effective participation of all
relevant stakeholders, including
indigenous peoples, local communities
and civil society, at all stages of
implementation, although the many
note that there could be improvements
in this regard.66 Financing by Norway
depends on “contributions-for-
delivery” whereby payments will be
made to Indonesia based on a
progressive implementation of
REDD+.
65 To read the Letter of Intent, see
www.unorcid.org/upload/doc_lib/Norway-
Indonesia-LoI.pdf
66 Butt, Simon et. al. 2015. Climate
Change and Forest Governance – Lessons
from Indonesia, Routledge Research in
International Environmental Law.
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More recently, there were new
moves and agreements made alongside
Indonesia’s change of administration.
In the area of forestry and sustainable
development, November 2015 saw the
government of Norway and the Global
Green Growth Institute (GGGI) pledge
to support Indonesia's program of green
economic development through
inclusive development program, where
it aims to be both sustainable and
environmentally-friendly. Norway has
pledged to contribute in the form of a
grant of US$ 19 million through the
program, which has been carried out by
GGGI and the National Development
Planning Board (Badan Perencanaan
dan Pembangunan Nasional, or
Bappenas) since 2013.67 The signing of
the agreement meant the continuation
of support for the green economic
development after reported success in
the first phase of the program.68 Under
the agreement support would be
67 "Indonesia: Norway Pledges Support
for Indonesia's Green Economic Development
Program." 2015. Asia News Monitor, Dec 02.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/173801194
3?accountid=17242
68 UNIDO and GGGI. 2015. Global
Green Growth: Clean Industry Investments and
Expanding Opportunities. Volume II:
Experiences of Brazil, Germany, Indonesia, the
Republic of Korea and South Africa. Vienna
and Seoul.
continued in financing projects in the
second phase including investment in
the sectors of renewable energy, special
economic zone, forestry and utilization
of other lands – purportedly motivated
by the leadership shown by the
government by choosing development
of green economy to reach economic
growth and to answer environmental
and climate challenges faced by the
Indonesian people.69
Aside from forestry, another area
deeply affected by climate change is
fishery. Progressively, the potential
monetary, social, and political impacts
of climate change are under dialog,
including for living marine assets; with
various worldwide establishments
identified with fisheries as of now
voicing their worry.70 As Norway’s
oceans range from the North Sea to the
Central Arctic Ocean, covering an area
69 Ibid.
70 Some of these institutions include the
FAO Committee of Fisheries (COFI), and even
the UN General Assembly in 2007. For the
latter, see Resolution adopted by the General
Assembly: Sustainable fisheries, including
through the 1995 Agreement for the
Implementation of the Provisions of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of
10 December 1982 relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks,
and related instruments. A/RES/62/177.
https://daccess-
ods.un.org/TMP/3389933.7053299.html/.
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of more than 2 million km2 – thus, the
basis for globally important fisheries of
a number of fish and crustacean
species, as well of marine mammals71 –
it is no surprise that the State has
implemented very particular domestic
and international regimes in the interest
of protecting this resource against the
worst effects of climate change. A vital
element of this regime is that the
administration elements of science,
directions, and implementation are
disseminated at different levels of
administration. Expanding on the
worldwide structure given by the 1982
Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS)
and the 1995 UN Fish Stocks
Agreement, the administration
highlights broad collaboration with
Russia in the North in the
administration of shared fish stocks,
and in addition participation in a few
local game plans on the administration
of straddling fish stocks. It in this
manner involves significant universal
participation and also organizations and
71 Harsem, Øistein and Alf Håkon Hoel.
2013. "Climate Change and Adaptive Capacity
in Fisheries Management: The Case of
Norway." International Environmental
Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 13
no. 1. pp. 49-63.
measures at the domestic level of
administration.
Indonesia
Indonesia has completed the
process of ratifying the Paris
Agreement, and that process is an
attempt to formulate the international
instrument so it becomes a part of the
national legal system. Although quite a
few countries have started their own
ratification processes much earlier – a
smart move when it comes to all the
hubbub of legislating – policy-wise,
Indonesia’s (belated) commitment will
still generate considerable impact, be it
national or international in nature.
The position occupied by
Indonesia in international climate
negotiations remains a hefty one. As
one of the top emitters of greenhouse
gas, behind China (the largest emitter
in the world), the United States, the
European Union, India, and Russia;
Indonesia is influential in deciding the
direction of climate policies.72 Though
mathematically, Indonesia’s emission
72 World Resources Institute.
Indonesian Climate Policy and Data in CAIT
Indonesia Climate Data Explorer (PINDAI).
http://www.wri.org/publication/indonesian-
climate-policy-and-data-cait-indonesia-climate-
data-explorer-pindai/. (accessed October 19th
2016).
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is about one-tenth of China’s –
excluding land use change and
activities in forestry – the fact remains
that the amount still looms over any
other developing country.
Land use change and activities in
forestry (kegiatan alih guna lahan dan
kehutanan) is considered the largest
contribution of emission in Indonesia,
amounting to more than twice the
amount emissions compared to any
other activity outside of that sector.
This thesis suggests that this is caused
by high rates of deforestation, forest
degradation, encroachment, and land
clearing, but perhaps most importantly,
the continued pervasiveness of forest
fires – which in turn, results in
transboundary haze, and whose own
impacts is most felt by the regional and
international community.
Aside from forestry, the energy
and transportation sector contributes
significantly towards Indonesia’s total
greenhouse gas emission. Data from
Bappenas (Badan Perencanaan
Pembangunan Nasional, National
Development Planning Agency) shows
that until 2030, the energy sector by far
outweighs land use change in emission.
The amount of land that will be used
for the needs of other sectors grows
more and more limited with time, while
the need for energy will continue to
increase in direct proportion to
population growth and economic
activities. There is some truth in this
claim, as generally, a State’s total
emission of greenhouse gases
correlates with its’ population, gross
domestic product (GDP), and the
increasing energy needs of industries
and transportation, along with the sort
of energy being used (i.e. renewable, or
non-renewable energy).
By 2030, the Indonesian
government has targeted to reduce
emission by:
1. 29 per cent, if done purely
through domestic state budgeting;
2. 41 per cent, if done with
international aid.
What remains critical, however, is
the probable dissonance between
reference points if no efforts are done
(business as usual) and the targeted
reduction; because should there be any
miscalculation, obviously targets, no
matter how ambitious or sensible,
would not be met. Thus, credible
systems of measurement, reporting, and
verification (MRV) as established by
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international legal instruments like the
Kyoto Protocol all remain key in
national emission reduction policies.
The current administration has
been working hard to meet these
reduction targets on multiple levels. It
has been two years since the Ministry
of Environment and Forestry
established a subdivision focusing on
issues of climate change (Direktorat
Jenderal Pengendalian Perubahan
Iklim), tasked to coordinate
mitigation/adaptation actions, develop
a monitoring and evaluation system,
figure out the requisite funding
mechanisms, and curtail forest fires.
Additionally, recent developments
include the establishment of Badan
Restorasi Gambut,73 whose prime
directive is to restore the multitude of
damaged peatlands (which may result
in fires) as well as mitigate the severe
impact of haze. We must look upon
73 A non-structural body (lembaga
nonstruktural) established via Peraturan
Presiden No. 1/2016 tentang Badan Restorasi
Gambut. See Wikipedia. Badan Restorasi
Gambut.
https://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Badan_Restorasi_
Gambut/ (accessed October 19th 2016); as well
as the direct link to the regulation,
http://www.bpn.go.id/Publikasi/Peraturan-
Perundangan/Peraturan-Presiden/peraturan-
presiden-republik-indonesia-nomor-1-tahun-
2016-61704/
these developments with a wary yet
optimistic eye.
CONCLUSION
Law is never made in a vacuum.
Factors such as political instability and
administration changes affect State
compliance in ways that can – and have
been – well documented. Throughout
the international climate change
regime’s development up until 2012,
the emergence of new and helpful
mechanisms and negotiation processes
were often accompanied by setbacks
such as withdrawals and unmet State
obligations; almost in the same breath.
It needs to be seen if such a pattern re-
establishes itself in the post-2012
regime, and if so, what that might
mean.
The United States exemplifies non-
commitment in climate change.
Administration(s) in office during the
first commitment period of the Kyoto
Protocol paid little to no attention to
the regime’s tone of urgency. Obama’s
administration seemed more outwardly
environmentally conscious compared
to his predecessors, though this can
partially be contributed to general
political party lines. As Kyoto’s first
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commitment period ended and the
second one took place, some domestic
agendas were put into place to
accommodate this increasing
awareness, and new ideas formed on
how to combat/obtain protection from
climate change’s deleterious impacts
(i.e. climate litigation). However, all
these steps are at risk of stumbling
back, or demolished entirely, given the
results of the most current U.S.
Presidential Elections of 2016.
Canada’s withdrawal from the
Kyoto Protocol in December 2011
illustrates the soft nature of
international law, where State consent
is an absolute requirement and can be
revoked any time the State wishes.
Even the widely-acknowledged/ratified
climate change regime is not exempt
from this principle; and this move from
Canada calls the effectiveness of the
Kyoto Protocol in particular into
question.
The European Union (EU) is the
only regional organization to date that
is Party to the Kyoto Protocol. The
second commitment period required the
EU to submit to binding targets, and it
did so, though past resistance to
environmentally friendly policies such
as carbon taxes lead to skeptics
remaining unconvinced. Whether or
not the relative success in dropping
emissions can be contributed to
regional synchronization or the
individual performance of said States
require further study.
Brazil played a big part in
establishing and providing the idea for
REDD+, a mechanism under
UNFCCC. It stemmed in part from
Kyoto Protocol negotiations and the
Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) in particular. The REDD+
mechanism was continually refined,
culminating in the Warsaw Framework,
though there were no new
developments by the time of COP-20 in
December 2014. Due to the major
focus on (tropical) forestry, Brazil
emissions in the Amazonian forests has
reduced and may be valuable guidance
for other large, tropical nations looking
to do the same. However, more recent
political instability may prove a threat
to
Norway is an odd amalgamation in
the realm of climate change, as it is a
country dubbed an “oil nation,” but at
the same time most concerned about
how rising temperatures can affect its’
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oceans. Most of what Norway has done
in this regard has been in the area of
fishery. Notably for the purposes of
this thesis, however, is the fact that
Norway has explicitly partnered up
with Indonesia by way of the
aforementioned REDD+ mechanism.
There are at least three indicators
espoused in this thesis meant to.
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